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Introduction 
The existence of equilibriu:m points in finite ga:me s, as formulated by 
von Neu:mann and Morgenstern [11], [6], [7], has been established by Nash [8], [91. 
The :method of proof is analytic, e:mploying a fixed point argu:ment. 
We give an algebraic characterization of e quilibriu:m points in Theore:ms 
1 and In. This raises the possibility (so far unresolved) of an algebraic proof of 
Nash's existence theore:m. We also show that equilibriu:m points can be described 
in ter:ms of sol utions to certain nonlinear progra :ms in Theorems 2. and 2n. The se 
generalize well-known equivalences between :matrix ga:mes a nd linear progra:ms [1], 
[2], [3], [10]. 
In Theore:m 3, equilibriu:m points f o r a two-person (nonzero-sum) ga:me 
are further characterized in solutions of a syste:m f linear inequalities in which 
certain variables :must be integers. This c h a r acte r i zation, i n c onjunction with 
technique s of integer linear progra:m:ming [4], a llo ws th e pos sibi lity of syste:matic 
co:mputation of equilibrium points for the t wo-pe rson c a se. 
Finally, in Theore:m 4, we note a u riou s relation between the Lagrange 
:multipliers and the original variables of the nonlin e a r p r ogra:ms of Theore:ms 2 
and 2n; a solution to these progra:ms plays a dua l r o l e , serving si:multaneously 
as values for the original variables a nd as L a gra nge :multipliers. 
Since our general sche:me can be e a sil y infe r red f ro:m the treat:ment of 
two-person ga:mes, this case is treated first . We use the conveniences of :matrix 
notation; e will denote a vector (row or colu:mn) with each entry I , while vector 
or :matrix inequalitie s hold entry by e ntry. 
Two-person Ga m s 
Let G be a two-person game in normalized form [11], characterized 
by two real m by n payoff matrices, A :: (a . . ), B = (b o .): if player 1 chooses IJ IJ 
i £ {L ... , m} and player 2 (simultaneously) choose s j £ { L ... , n}, then 1 is 
2. 
paid a .. and 2 is paid b o .' Mixed strategies for 1 and. 2 a re probability vec t ors of 
IJ IJ 
dimensions m and n; for convenience, we regards l's mixed strategies as row 
vectors and 2' s as column vectors. Let X and Y denot e the sets of mixed strategies 
for players 1 and 2; i. e. 
X = {x :; (x..) I xe = 1, x ~ o}, 
1 
Y := {y ~ (y.) I ey ~ 1, y> O}. 
J -
If 1 uses mixed strategy x E X and 2 uses y E Y, their expected payoffs are 9 
respectively 
xAy = L; x ,a .. y., 
i, j 1 1J J xBy 
An equilibriwn point is a pair of mixed strategies, (x~ yL such that for all 
X E X, Y E Y, 
xAy 2 xAy, xBy > xBy. 
A theorem due to Nash [9] as serts the existe c of an equilibrium point for every 
game G. We note, for later reference, that A and B Dlay be taken so 0 < a,. < 1, 
- IJ-
o < b , . < .l (all i and j), by a. change in s cale a nd origin of the payoff measurements 
- 1J-
without loss of generality in regard to equilib rium points. 
Theorem 1. (x, y) i s a n equilibriu m point of game G, 
if and onl y if there exi s t scalar s (1( , 13 s uch that 
Ay < ae, xB < l3e, xAy + xBy :: a + .[3'9 XE X, Y E Y • 
Proof. Let (x, y) be an e q ilibr i u m p oint of ga me G and define a == xAy, 
13 := xBy. Then, for all x E X, Y E Y, 
xAy < a, or Ay < £te , xBy~ 13, or xB < l3e. 
Since xAy + xBy ;:: a + 13, by definition, a nd x E X, Y ~ Y, the system of the Theorem 
is satisifed. 
On the other hand, let (x, y, QI ,~) s atisfy 'he syste m of t he Theorem. 
Then, multiplying the first relation by x, and the s e c ond by y, we have 
and these with 
xAy ~ a, xBy < ~ ; 
xAy + xBy = a + ~ impl y 
xAy :; a , 
Thus , for any x~ X, y £ Y, 
xBy = 13. 
xAy .:: QI = xAy, xBy < ~ - xBy 
and (x, y) is an equilibrium point of game G. 
Theorem 2 0 (X9 y) is an e quilibrium point of game G 
i f and only if (x, y, a , 13) is a solu i on 'o r program 
P: max xAy + xBy - a ~ f3 
when Ay~ ae, xB~ ~e ~ xe;X , yg Y 
Proof. We note, to begin with, th a by o mbining the constraint s of 
program P we obtain 
xAy + xBy - a - J3 ~ 0 
hence 9 the value of program P, i f it exist s , is nonp o s i tive. 
Let (x ~ y) be an equilibrium point of game G. The n the syste m of 
Theorem 1 is satisfied; 1. e. t here exi s ' a and {:3 BU h that 
Ay .:: ae , xB ~ J3e , x e: X~ y £: y 
so (x s y p a, 13) is feasible in program p , a nd i n addition 
xAy + xBy ~ - ~ = 0 
so (x, y -&' ,9 13) is ~ i ndeed, a solut i on f or program P. 
On the other hand . let (x ~ y , a g ~) b e a solu ti on 'o r p r ogr am. P. The 
theorem of Nash guarantees the exi s ten ce f an e qw lib r iu rn point (x ~ y) for 
game G and thereby , by the r e asoning a b v e , t h e xis t ne e f a solu i on 
4. 
(x, y, a? ~) for program P with value zero. Then we have, for (x, y, a, I3), 
xA Y + xBy - a - {3 = 0 
Ay ~ ae, xB ~ {3e, x £ X, Y E Y . 
This is the system of Theorem 1; hence (x, y) is an equilibrium point of game G. 
Theorem 30 (x, y) is an equilibrium point of game G 
if and only if there exist scalars a, {3 and vectors 
u, v, such that 
o < ae - A y ~ e - u < e - x 
o < {3e - xB < e - v < e - y 
X £ X, Y £ Y , 
and the components of u, v are integers. 
Proof. We show the system of Theorem 3 is equivalent to the system 
of Theorem 1. The result desired then follows immediately. 
Let (x, y, a,~, u, v,) satisfy the system of Theorem 3. Then 
O<x~u~e, O~y~v<e 
and components of u and v are 0 or 1. 
and 
Now, if u. = 1, a - ~ a . . y. = 0; 
1 j IJ J 
if u . _. 0, 
1 
x . c::: 0; 
1 
~ x.(a - ~ a .. y.) = 0, or a ::.: xAy. 
i 1 IJ J 
Similarly, ~ = xBy, and it can be yerified that (x, y , a, {3) satisfies the system of 
Theorem 1. 
On the other hand, let (x, y , ,(3) satisfy the s y s t e m of Theorem 1, 
and defil).e 
1 if x . > 0 
_ { 1 




1 if y. > 0 
= { < J 
o if y. = 0 
J 
We also note, since 0 < a .. < 1, IJ ~ 
o < b < 1, that 
ij 
o < a = xAy ~ 1., o < 13 = xBy < 1. 
5. 
Then 1 it can be readily verified that (x, y, a: 13, u, v) satisfies the s y stem of 
Theorem 3. 
n-Person Garnes 
An n-per son game G in normalized form is characterized by an 
n 
n-vector of multilinear payoff forms in n vectors, t h e mixed strate gies of 
the players - 1. e. , 
•• 0 , X £ X 
n n 
where each A, is linear (homogeneous) in each vector x. = (x.k ) and each 1 J J 
vector x. is a probability vector of the set of probabilit y vectors X .. 
J J 
An equilibrium point is a v ector of mixe d s t r a t egies x = (xl' ... ~ xn) 
such that for all x. EX. 
1 1 
A . (x) > A . (x Ix.), 
II
all i , 
the notation on the right side meaning that the ~ th . d . 1 mlxe strategy x . IS 
1 
replaced by X. 
1 
The theorem of Nash as s er t s that every game G , for 
n 
every fin i te n, h a s an equilibrium poi n t . 
Cor respondingl y, we consider the nonlinear program, in vector 
variables J xl~ ... , xn ' and scalar va.riable s, al' ... , an 
p maximize 
when A i (x :i) < a, e, 
- 1 
x . £ X . , 
1 1 
a ll i 
where Ak(x :i) is t h e vector of c o e ffi c i en s of ompo n ents o f the v e ctor xi in 
the multi linear form A (x). We a . so denote the m a tri x of c oeff icient s of x.x. 
--k 1 J 
in Ak(x) by Ak(x:ij) ; note the produ t xiAk(x:i j ) = Ak(x:j ). The generalization 
of the two-person _case follows. Since the proof s a r e direct extensions of 
Theorems above, they are omitted. 
Theorem In. x = (x.., ••. , x) is an equilibrium 
1. n 
point of game G if and only if there exists a vector 
n 
tl = (aI' ."., an) such that 
A. (x:i) < tl. e, 
1 - 1 
Theorem 2n. 
~ tlk , x E X., k i 1 all i . 
x is an equilibrium point of game G 
n 
if and only if (x, a) is a solution for program P . 
n 
The equivalence of Theorem 2n between game G and program P 
n n 
suggests the possibility of further characterization through t he introduction 
6. 
and interpretation of Lagrange multipliers from nonlin ear programming theory 
[5}, [12]. Curiously enough, no further information is forthcoming as the 
following statement shows. We leave its demonst rat ion for the reader. 
Theorem 4. The Kuhn-Tu cke nec essary condition 
[5] that a feasible (x, 0') be a soluti on fo r program P 
n 
is that there exists Lagrange m .tip liers ( , 'Y) s u ch 
that, for all i 
n 
This condition is s a tisf ied when ( t ,,) is t.aken to b e 
(x~ a), the solution for program P , itself . 
n 
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